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2001 Panel Discussion on Current Issues
in Trademark Law – I’ll See Your Two
Pesos and Raise You . . . Two Pesos,
Wal-Mart . . . and TrafFix: Where is U.S.
Supreme Court Jurisprudence Heading,
and How Will it Affect Trademark
Practitioners?
Moderator:
Panelists:

Hugh Hansen*
Glenn Mitchell**
Inna Fayenson***
Perry Saidman****

MR. GALBRAITH: Good evening. I’m Kevin Galbraith,
incoming Editor-in-Chief of the Fordham Intellectual Property,
Media & Entertainment Law Journal. On behalf of the entire
Journal, welcome to tonight’s panel discussion, which we are
proud to co-sponsor with the Trademark Law Committee of the
New York State Bar Association.1
Through discussion amongst the panelists and attendees, we seek
to shed light on the evolving jurisprudence in trade dress and to
explore how it might affect practitioners.
Thank you all for coming.

*
Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Rutgers University, B.A.
1968; Georgetown University, J.D. 1972; Yale University School of Law, LL.M. 1977.
**
Special Counsel, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP. Wesleyan University, B.A.
1984; St. John’s University, J.D. 1987 (cum laude).
***
Partner, Kronish Lieb Weiner & Hellman LLP. Columbia University (Barnard
College), B.A. 1985 (magna cum laude); Harvard University, J.D. 1988 (cum laude).
****
Principal, Saidman Design Law Group. George Washington University, B.S.E.E.
1967; University of Pennsylvania, M.S.E.E. 1968; George Washington University, J.D.
1973 (with honors).
1
This discussion was held on April 2, 2001, in the McNally Amphitheatre at
Fordham University School of Law. Footnotes were provided by the Fordham
Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal.
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It is now my pleasure to introduce John Feerick, Dean of
Fordham University School of Law.
DEAN FEERICK: Thank you very much.
I just want to say how pleased our school is to have this
opportunity to co-sponsor a program on current issues in the field
of trademark law with the State Bar’s Trademark Law Committee,
and I want to acknowledge our gratitude to Peter Sloane and the
members of the Committee for the opportunity to do this.
If there is one challenge that is out there, that a program like this
deals with, it is to have more discussions involving the academic
community and the practicing bar. It is something that there has
been a lot of discussions going on about among bar leaders and law
school deans across the country. I think it is wonderful here in
New York that the State Bar and its various committees are doing
programs in the law schools, and I am very grateful on behalf of
our school to the leadership of the Trademark Law Committee, in
particular.
I want to express my gratitude to all the panelists, to the
moderator, Professor Hugh Hansen of our faculty, and I want to
thank the students of the Law School for their own energy that
makes possible programs such as the one tonight.
I know you will have a very interesting discussion on Supreme
Court jurisprudence dealing with trademark, which brings me back
to my own days as a practicing lawyer, some thirty years ago,
when I had some trademark litigation matters, and worked pretty
hard to settle them all.
So all the best for a very good program and thank you so much
for being here.
MR. GALBRAITH: Thank you, Dean Feerick, and thank you to
all the panelists. We are very happy to have you here. You are a
distinguished group, and I know we will have an interesting
discussion.
Hugh Hansen, this evening’s moderator, is a Professor of Law at
Fordham University, where he has been teaching since 1978. For
the past nine years, Professor Hansen has hosted an annual
conference on the state of international intellectual property law
and policy here at Fordham. The website for the conference is
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The Journal is grateful for

With that, let’s begin. Professor Hansen.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Thank you, Kevin, and congratulations
to you and the other members of the Journal for putting together
another very good program with excellent panelists. I am certainly
honored to have been asked to be a part of it.
Kevin asked me to just start off with a little bit of an introduction
to the topic.
I think trade dress protection is an interesting aspect of
intellectual property law. Intellectual property law is generally
interesting and through various developments has attracted the
attention of the public, business and the Supreme Court. The
Court is taking more intellectual property cases than ever before in
its history.
Historically, trademark law has been a backwater, or more
charitably, a boutique area of the law. Not many lawyers practiced
it and few law schools taught it. The consuming public was not
aware of marks and brands as such. Personal knowledge of the
seller was sufficient in our small-town economy to protect and
inform the consumer. Trademark law then, as it does now,
reflected the nature of the market place and the needs of consumers
and sellers.2
Early trademark law was rigid protecting only “technical
marks.”3 Consumers were not thought to see source identification
in anything but fanciful and arbitrary marks.4 The seller who
objected to another seller’s confusing marketing was often left to
the law of unfair competition,5 where justice would be done on an
ad hoc basis. Common law courts required intent to deceive or
passing off, not expecting likelihood of confusion, unless the
defendant had taken actions to achieve confusion.
2

See generally 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 5:2 (4th
ed. 1996) (discussing the development of trademark in Anglo-American common law).
3
See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 5:3 (discussing the history of United
States trademark legislation).
4
See generally id.
5
See generally id. at § 5:2.
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As markets became regional and then national, and new products
were introduced into the marketplace, advertising was needed to
inform the consumer about who was producing a product and its
quality. As people became more aware of brands and the need to
search for source identifiers for non-locally produced products,
trademark law expanded the subject matter it protected. For
instance, courts created the doctrine of “suggestive” marks as a
way to prevent likelihood of confusion without the need for the
plaintiff to prove intent to deceive.6
As consumer awareness and sophistication about the nature of
marks and brands increased, courts continued to expand what
would be protected as a source identifier by trademark law. As a
result, today, there is little need for the law of unfair competition
since full protection is available against junior users under
trademark law,7 unlike the law in the United Kingdom,8 Germany,9
and other countries where unfair competition law remains
important.
The area of trade dress protection mirrors the growth of
trademark law in general. Originally, trade dress protection was
left to the law of unfair competition. Courts did not see consumers
as easily treating trade dress, usually packaging, as a source
identifier, just as they had not seen consumers treating nontechnical marks as source indicators. Thus, courts required
plaintiffs to prove secondary meaning before finding protectable
trade dress.10
Trade dress protection is more controversial than protection for
marks as it affects the discretion of how competitors present their
product to the public, not just what they may call themselves or
their products. In addition, the Supreme Court in the 1930s, 1940s,
1950s, and 1960s was suspicious of intellectual property law in
general, and trademark law in particular. The Warren Court
6

See generally id. at § 11:4 (discussing the nature of inherently distinctive marks).
See generally id. at § 1:8 (discussing unfair competition and its relationship to
trademark).
8
See generally 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:35 (discussing European
Trademark Law and Policy).
9
See generally id.
10
See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 1.8.
7
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indicated its hostility in Sears11 and Compco12 where it broadly
held there was federal preemption of state trademark protection for
three-dimensional marks and state law was preempted whenever
there would be public confusion.13 This was consistent with the
Court’s belief that intellectual property law – and specifically
trademark law – was anti-competitive, a monopoly of sorts that
should be limited.14
This negative approach has since been rejected by the U.S.
Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) and by the courts, in part as a
result of the growth and influence of the Chicago School of Law
and Economics analysis.15 Modern approaches to law and
economics view trademarks as a cornerstone of competition in the
marketplace, and competition concerns should be dealt with by
fine-tuning trademark law not by broadly limiting what may be
protected.
With this new approach, trade dress was viewed not as
inherently antithetical to sound policy, but rather something that
should be protected when it serves as a source identifier.16 If trade
dress does serve as a source identifier and it is not protected, there
will be consumer confusion and the owner’s goodwill will be
subject to free riding by competitors. So we see growth in
protection of trade dress,17 especially packaging trade dress,18
which is considered less anticompetitive.

11

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
13
See Sears, Roebuck, 376 U.S. at 231-232, Compco, 376 U.S. at 238.
14
See Sears, Roebuck, 376 U.S. at 230, Compco, 376 U.S. at 238.
15
See generally 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW
227 (1998)
The distinctive approach associated with [the Chicago School of Law and
Economics is a] willingness of members of the school to accept as a working
hypothesis that humans act rationally when making choices, including making
choices about how to respond to the legal system, that market determined
outcomes are consistent with social welfare, and that government intervention
in market processes is in most cases unlikely to advance social welfare.
Id.
16
See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 3:8-9 (discussing the role of source
identification in trademark law).
17
See generally 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, Section III, Ch. 7 (discussing the nature
and evolution of trade dress in product and container shapes).
12
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In line with this new approach, some courts removed the
requirement that trade dress needed secondary meaning to be
protected. The Supreme Court adopted this position in Two
Pesos19 in 1992. Justice White treated the issue as an easy one,
without any indication of the reasons for past suspicion of trade
dress protection. Trade dress should be treated no differently from
any other source indicator. Trade dress was capable of being
inherently distinctive and did not per se need secondary meaning.
Unlike in Sears and Compco, there was no concern in Two Pesos
about the anti-competitive effects of trademark protection.
The Court again addressed trade dress protection in Qualitex20 in
1995, where it held that the single color of a product could be
protected under trademark law. Justice Breyer’s opinion in
Qualitex reads like an ode to the value of trademarks. He sets forth
the various reasons why protection of trademarks is beneficial and
rejects an approach that excludes per se certain things from the
subject matter of trademark.21 Everything should be subject to
trademark protection, and then, if there is a competitive problem,
courts should use the functionality defense on an ad hoc basis to
resolve any possible anticompetitive effects of protection.22
Trademark protection is, so to speak, the default drive and
anticompetitive concerns should be addressed on a micro basis in
fact-specific situations where applicable.23
There is dicta in Qualitex that a single color can never be
inherently distinctive.
This derives not because of any
anticompetitive concerns about protection but because Justice
Breyer says, incorrectly in my view, that color only describes the
product and, thus, can never be inherently distinctive.24 In fact, a
single color can be inherently distinctive. A red top of a bolt, for
instance, would undeniably be an inherently distinctive way of
identifying one’s brand of bolts.
18

See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 7:53-54 (discussing the nature and
evolution of state and federal protection of trade dress in product shape).
19
See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
20
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
21
See id. at 172-73.
22
See id. at 169-70.
23
See id.
24
See id. at 162-63.
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The Court’s concern with the possible anticompetitive effects of
trade dress can be seen in two recent “product-design” cases. WalMart25 presented the issue of how to determine whether a product
configuration or design can be inherently distinctive. TrafFix,26
presented the issue of whether a utility patent prevented any trade
dress protection for the product design after the patent expired. In
both, the facts presented weak cases for protection and this may
have influenced the Court.
Wal-Mart involved a clothes maker’s designs of children’s
clothes that contained certain consistent features. The clothes
maker wanted protection for a family of products, thereby
increasing the concern for anticompetitive effects of protection.
The basic look of the clothes was attractive, so much so that WalMart ordered a copy-cat design for its children’s clothing line.
Wal-Mart was an unfortunate case to present the trade dress
issue to the Court since (i) it seemed doubtful that, in fact,
consumers saw the design as a source indicator, and (ii) it looked
like additional protection because Wal-Mart was also held liable
for copyright infringement and was subject to an injunction and
damages regardless of the outcome of the trade dress issue. The
district court judge obviously viewed Wal-Mart as a bad guy and
issued a very broad injunction.27 The Second Circuit affirmed the
holding of liability but narrowed the injunction.28 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari on the issue of what test should be used to
determine whether the product design trade dress was inherently
distinctive.
There were many amicus curiae including the DOJ and the
International Trademark Association (“INTA”). The plaintiff and
all the amici proposed tests to determine whether the design was
inherently distinctive. The DOJ and INTA urged the Court to
adopt a test used by the Federal Circuit first devised when it was

25
26
27

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1255 (2001).
See Samara Brothers, Inc. v. Judy-Philippine, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y.

1997).
28

See Samara Brothers, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1998).
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the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.29 Only Wal-Mart
argued that product design trade dress should always require
secondary meaning.30
The Supreme Court, showing its independence did not follow
the DOJ, whose amicus arguments it normally examines very
carefully in intellectual property (“IP”) cases; INTA;31 the Federal
Circuit, which, after all, is “the IP court;” or any other court that
considered the issue. Instead, the Court determined that in all
situations product design trade dress requires proof of secondary
meaning to be protected.
The Court was concerned about the anticompetitive
consequences of protecting product designs that do not actually
serve as source indicators. This might have been one of those
situations yet two respected courts, the Southern District of New
York and the Second Circuit, both held that the clothing designs
were inherently distinctive. In oral argument, the Court asked the
Deputy Solicitor General why this design was inherently
distinctive. He replied that the DOJ was not taking a position on
whether the design was inherently distinctive, and instead was only
concerned with what test should be used.32
Unlike Wal-Mart, the threat of a lawsuit might stop some
competitors from using a particular trade dress because of the
transaction costs involved in defending a lawsuit, leaving the
public without competition for a design that does not serve as a
source indicator. In short, the first company to use a design that
became popular could use claims of trade dress protection to
suppress competition. It was not surprising that, on the facts of
this case, the Court would have these concerns. Moreover, the
Court did not have to worry about large retailers such as Wal-Mart

29

See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae for Petitioner at 17-18, Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (No. 99-150).
30
See Brief for Petitioner at 10, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529
U.S. 205 (2000) (No. 99-150).
31
See Brief of the International Trademark Association in Support of Neither Party,
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (No. 99-150).
32
See generally Transcript of Proceedings at 17-18, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara
Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (No. 99-150); 2000 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 20.
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stealing designs on attractive clothing as copyright law was
available to provide protection.
TrafFix, decided this Term, presented another fact pattern for
neutrally bringing the issue of trade dress before the Court. The
plaintiff had a utility patent on a road sign with protection for the
configuration of the legs supporting the stand. After the patent
expired, it sued a competitor that copied the configuration. It
claimed that there was secondary meaning in the design, and thus a
likelihood of consumer confusion when the defendant used the
design. This was highly unlikely for two reasons. First, secondary
meaning was doubtful. Second, the buyers of the signs were not
members of the public but rather sophisticated people in
construction. The case was presented to the Court as an expired
patent holder using trademark law to extend its patent.
The District Court had dismissed the case holding that trade
dress was not permissible per se because of the expired utility
patent.33 The Sixth Circuit reversed34 and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.35
This time, the Solicitor General’s Office of the DOJ, which had
been relying on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) in
past IP cases, did not use the PTO but rather used the Antitrust
Division. This only makes sense if the Solicitor General’s Office
had already determined that the anticompetitive aspects
outweighed any intellectual property concerns – something
difficult for the lay lawyers in the Solicitor General’s Office who
had little background in either area of the law. Perhaps, it was
because the Solicitor General’s Office felt burned after Wal-Mart
when its views were ignored by a Court that signaled its concern
with anticompetitive effects of product design protection.
They came up with the idea that it should be a per se test:36 If
there has been a utility patent, trade dress protection is never
33

Marketing Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Mich.

1997).
34

Marketing Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 1999).
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 530 U.S. 1260 (2001).
36
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1213&19-20, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 530 U.S. 1260 (2001) (No.
99-1571).
35
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available – a throwback to the 1950s and 1960s Warren Court
analysis.
Fortunately, the Court did not adopt the Solicitor General’s
argument, however it did show that it is very concerned about this
protection for product configuration. The Court rejected the
mainstream test for so-called “functionality” that provides
protection for trade dress that is a source indicator unless such
protection prevents “effective competition.” – a test Judge Posner
created in the Seventh Circuit37 and which has since been adopted
elsewhere. Likewise, it rejected the Federal Circuit’s idea of de
jure functionality and de facto functionality,38 which also indicates
that trade dress may serve a utilitarian function and still be
protected. Rather, it went back to dictum in Inwood Laboratories39
– that if trade dress affects the cost or quality of a product it may
not be protected.
The Court indicated a hostility to product design trade dress
protection not seen before. It also indicated it might adopt the
DOJ’s per se test:
[I]f in fact the federal courts applying our standard
give de facto patent utility protection to trade dress,
we will consider the issue we are reserving now
whether it is a per se rule, that once something has
been granted a utility patent, it will be barred
forever from being protectable trade dress.40
So, it appears that product configuration trade dress faces a
tough road when there has been a utility patent granted.
We will leave it now to the panelists to tell us in more detail
what has happened and what will happen, and then we will open
the floor to discussion with the audience and among the panelists.
37

See Judith Beth Prowda, The Trouble with Trade Dress Protection of Product
Design, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1309, 1345-1355 (1998) (discussing the “Seventh Circuit Rule”
and its evolution).
38
See generally Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844
(1982).
39
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10
(1982).
40
See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 164-67.
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Glenn Mitchell from Stroock & Stroock & Lavan will be our
first speaker. He is going to discuss the issue of distinctiveness
from Two Pesos to the Wal-Mart cases.
MR. MITCHELL: Thank you.
We all know that there are countless products that we recognize
just by the packaging or the shape of the product itself, even when
we cannot see the label, when we are too far away to see the label:
anything from the classic Coca-Cola bottle; to the Rolls-Royce
grille; to a different kind of grill, the Weber barbecue kettle, which
is recognizable – at least to those of us who grew up in the
suburbs; or the Pepperidge Farm Goldfish for those of us who have
had kids or have been kids. As such, these items do indicate their
source and, therefore, function as trademarks.41 They represent the
goodwill of the manufacturers, allowing consumers to
automatically distinguish the Goldfish crackers from crackers
made by other companies, or the Rolls-Royce from a Jaguar or
another car.
Generally, as with most of these products, the association is built
up over time through the popularity of sales, through advertising
and other media attention. Until about nine years ago, when the
Supreme Court decided Two Pesos, ushering in what I will call
“the Golden Age of Trade Dress,” many courts, notably the Second
Circuit, required rigorous proof of this association – known as
secondary meaning – before they would grant protection to trade
dress.42
Two Pesos, as Professor Hansen mentioned, was a case that
involved competing Mexican restaurants, in which the junior user
copied many of the design aspects of the plaintiff’s Mexican
restaurants,43 going above and beyond simply having a sombrero
on the wall, which I think would be considered functional, or at
least necessary to give the flavor of a Mexican restaurant.

41
See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 4:12 (discussing the evolution of modern
“trademark”); see also Glenn Mitchell, In Samara Brothers, Supreme Court Brings
Second Circuit Full Circle on the Protectibility of Product Design as Trade Dress, 9
NYSBA BRIGHT IDEAS 2 (Fall 2000) (containing a detailed discussion of Mr. Mitchell’s
views on this subject matter).
42
See generally Willajeanne F. McLean, The Birth, Death, and Renaissance of the
Doctrine of Secondary Meaning in the Making, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 737, 753-57 (1993).
43
See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 765-66.
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Two Pesos came to the attention of the Supreme Court due to a
split in the circuits, with the Second Circuit requiring secondary
meaning, while other circuits, notably the Fifth Circuit, allowed
protection of inherently distinctive trade dress.44
The reasoning in Two Pesos was that the Lanham Act45 protects
any “word, term, name, symbol, or device,”46 and does not make
any distinctions between or among those different categories.47
Therefore, since trademarks can be protected if they are inherently
distinctive and automatically identify a source, then so can trade
dress.
Two Pesos came up to the Supreme Court only on the issue of
whether inherently distinctive trade dress could be protected, not,
“How do we determine inherently distinctive trade dress?”48 All
the Court said in that regard was that the jury instructions, which
followed the Abercrombie & Fitch standard49 that trade dress, like
trademarks, can be “arbitrary, descriptive, or generic,” were
appropriate instructions in that case.50
Over time, however, the different courts that went on to interpret
Two Pesos had to decide how to define trade dress, and many
courts found that the Abercrombie standard just did not cut it.51 It
is very difficult to describe the look of packaging or the look of a
product as descriptive or suggestive. Some courts use the Federal
Circuit’s Seabrook standard,52 which inquires whether the trade
dress was a “common basic shape or design, whether it was unique
or unusual in a particular field, whether it was a mere refinement
of a commonly adopted and well-known form of ornamentation for
a particular class of goods, viewed by the public as a dress or
44

See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 767, referencing Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary
Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1981) and Vibrant Sales, Inc. v.
New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981).
45
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (1997 and 1999 Supplement). Also referred to as the
Trademark Act of 1946. See also Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768-69.
46
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (1997 and 1999 Supplement).
47
See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768-69.
48
See generally Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 767.
49
See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768; Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.,
537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
50
See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at, 770.
51
See generally Michelle A. Shpetner, Note, Determining a Proper Test for Inherent
Distinctiveness in Trade Dress, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 949, 9811001 (1998).
52
See Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-well Foods, Inc., 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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ornamentation for the goods.”53
Now, this sounds good, but how does one apply it? Ultimately,
and since I go first, I get to say this ahead of my colleagues, the
courts, faced with inherent distinctiveness, decided that they “knew
it when they saw it.”
That is not to say that there are not standards. Some
commentators have come up with ways of going about looking at
trade dress, including looking at the industry to determine whether
a design was something that was used as an indicator of source.54
An example that I like to use is guitars. The musicians among
us that see guitars often know by the headstock whether it is a
Fender, a Gibson, a Kramer, or some other brand, and we can tell
that from far away. The designers, while they want to make the
guitar look and sound good – purely aesthetic or functional
considerations – also want to have that identification there. The
first guys that did it, that probably was not inherently distinctive.
They did it, they carved it, and ultimately it became their signature.
But now that is a part of the industry, if you see a new guitar with a
new and different headstock, you are going to say, “I wonder who
makes those.” So, there are ways that through development of
industry customs and consumer reaction thereto, product design
factors can be inherently distinctive.
The big problem that the courts faced as they went along, was
the difference between packaging and product design.55 Most
courts agree that packaging is generally created partly to be eyecatching, and partly to be source-identifying.56 Some courts also
recognized that products are not all looked at in the same way as
packaging, and that the standard of proving inherent
distinctiveness is much tougher.57
Some of the courts said: “No, the Supreme Court simply did not
make any distinctions; they said we must follow Abercrombie.”58
53

See id. at 1344.
See supra note 51; see also Glenn Mitchell, Rose Auslander, Trade Dress
Protection: Will a Statutorily Unified Standard Result in a Functionally Superior
Solution?, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 472, 500 (1998).
55
See supra note 51.
56
See id.
57
See id.
58
See id.
54
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Other courts, notably the Second and Third Circuits, have
recognized the inadequacies of applying a single standard both to
packaging and product configuration, saying “[w]e have to face
reality. Yes, inherently distinctive product design is protectable,
but the test to determine whether consumers actually view a
product design as an indicator of source without secondary
meaning is much tougher.”59 In fact, their tests set the bar very,
very high, so high that virtually no product designs could pass, but
theoretically some could.
That brings us to Wal-Mart. As Professor Hansen said, this was
a case that involved a small children’s clothing company named
Samara Brothers, that had a line of baby clothes featuring certain
relatively consistent design elements: They had lace around the
top, many of them had appliqués sewn on to them. It was a line of
clothes and there was testimony that there was a “Samara look.”
Wal-Mart saw it, Wal-Mart liked it, Wal-Mart decided they could
sell a whole lot of these a whole lot cheaper, and contracted with
somebody to do just that.
At the district court level, Wal-Mart lost on all grounds.60 The
jury found against it on copyright infringement and trade dress
infringement grounds,61 finding that the line of goods was
inherently distinctive, and although it is not really clear from the
history, there were enough facts there that I think they could have
found secondary meaning as well. Nevertheless, what happened
was that the jury said this was “Big Bad Wal-Mart” and they were
copying, and we have all been taught from a young age that
copying is just plain bad.
In fact, I think Judge Chin, in his decision denying Wal-Mart’s
request for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, agreed with WalMart that there was no protectable trade dress, but Judge Chin had
respect for the jury, felt it was enough of a case to get to the jury,
and let the verdict stand.62

59
60

See id.
See Samara Brothers, Inc. v. Judy-Philippine, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y.

1997).
61
62

See id. at 896-97.
See id. at 895.
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On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, with a dissent by Judge
Newman,63 who I think was the one judge on the whole case that
really got it right. Judge Newman found that the trade dress at
issue just did not meet the standard of inherent distinctiveness.64
He also cautioned against leaving too much for the jury.65 As a
plaintiff’s lawyer, if I had that case, I would want it before a jury.
I would want to show copying.
But when I read the trade-dress jury instructions in Wal-Mart –
and I have been practicing in this area for over a decade – even I
found them confusing. Judge Newman said that in these kinds of
cases, complex antitrust cases or copyright or trademark cases,
courts should be very careful to make sure that the jury is finding
fact and not deciding mixed questions of fact and law.66
The Supreme Court reversed, as Professor Hansen said, and in
fact the question for certiorari did not even anticipate the
possibility that product configuration trade dress could not be
inherently distinctive. The question was: “What do you have to
show?”67
Wal-Mart, nevertheless, argued in their briefs that no product
configuration trade dress is protectable,68 and the Supreme Court
agreed.69 In order to do that, I think they had to turn the reasoning
of Two Pesos on its head. Whereas Two Pesos said: “We can’t not
protect inherently distinctive trade dress because the Lanham Act
70
does not allow us to make that distinction,”71 in Wal-Mart
Justice Scalia said, “We can decide that product configuration
trade dress cannot be inherently distinctive because the Lanham
Act does not say we cannot.”72
63

See Samara Brothers, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 133 (2d Cir.

1998).
64

See Samara Brothers, at 165 F.3d at 133-137.
See id. at 135-137.
66
See id.
67
See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 207.
68
See Brief for Petitioner at 10, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529
U.S. 205 (2000) (No. 99-150).
69
See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 212.
70
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (1997 and 1999 Supplement). Also referred to as the
Trademark Act of 1946.
71
See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 774 (“It would be a different matter if there were
textual basis in § 43(a) for treating inherently distinctive verbal or symbolic trademarks
differently from inherently distinctive trade dress but there is none”).
72
See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 210.
65
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So I think they got it backwards for a couple of reasons.
As Professor Hansen said, the Court may have found comfort in
the fact that there was a copyright judgment below, and the Court
held that where you do have situations of trade dress that would
otherwise be distinctive, copyright protection or design patents are
available.73 As a practical matter, that is often not true. First,
although copyright protects works of authorship, including visual
and sculptural works, it does not protect things that are defined as
useful items, no matter how distinctive, creative or innovative.
Second, for the small guy who is coming up with the innovative
products and does not have the legal sophistication or the
wherewithal to start applying for design patents on every new item
that may or may not be successful, that is just not realistic.
So, in the guise of trying to prevent anticompetitive strike suits,
and, at least on its face, in fact trying to protect the little guy, I
think the Supreme Court is actually going to make it much more
difficult for new entrants into the market to gain a foothold by
coming up with some way of distinguishing their products by
design from those of other producers. The example used in the
decision was the cocktail shaker shaped like a penguin.74 Yes, it
was designed to be an attractive item. It was also designed as a
way to distinguish this cocktail shaker that I am selling from all
other cocktail shakers.
Also, the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart, I think, really flouted
congressional intent. In 1982, Two Pesos was decided. Courts
assumed that inherently distinctive trade dress, including product
configuration, was protectable.75 Congress did not see fit to
change that. In 1998, they introduced legislation that would have
codified the standard for trade dress.76 That never came to a
vote.77 Now, with Two Pesos, maybe that legislation will come
back.

73

See id. at 214.
See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213.
75
See supra note 51.
76
See H.R. 3163, 105th Cong. (2d Sess. 1988) (extension of remarks of Hon.
Howard Coble); see also Mitchell, supra note 41.
77
See H.R. 3163, § 2(g), 105th Cong. (2d Sess. 1988); see also Mitchell, supra note
41.
74
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Finally, I want to explore one other aspect. Many people might
look at Wal-Mart and say, “You know what? We haven’t got a
claim here anymore.” However, there is an old adage that where
there is a wrong, there is a remedy. In the dark days before Two
Pesos was decided, the Second Circuit, or at least district courts
within the Second Circuit, when faced with predatory conduct,
such as copying a distinctive novelty telephone design and the like,
embraced the concept of “secondary meaning in the making.”78
That doctrine held that if a junior user came in and copied some
product before it had the chance to become famous and to develop
secondary meaning – such conduct was wrongful and the junior
user would be enjoined.79
The Second Circuit and Federal Circuit ultimately rejected that
doctrine,80 and then it was mooted by Two Pesos. Nevertheless, in
a similar situation, courts will likely find some way to redress the
wrong, just as the jury in Wal-Mart sensed that there was
something that just smelled bad and threw the book at Wal-Mart.
Another way that the courts might go forward on this would be
to resurrect the presumption that when there is copying, that is a
sign that there is in fact secondary meaning, that the junior user
would not have copied if there were not secondary meaning.
In either of these cases, courts doing equity by finding a remedy
would be creating bad law. The courts should somehow get back
to protecting inherently distinctive product design and leave the
rest up to the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Thank you, Glenn.
Our next speaker is Inna Fayenson from Kronish Lieb Weiner &
Hellman, who will talk to us about the functionality doctrine.
MS. FAYENSON: Thank you, Professor Hansen. My topic
tonight is functionality, or the requirement of non-functionality for
trade dress protection. But the more general thesis of my talk is
that, looking at the Two Pesos/Wal-Mart/TrafFix line of decisions,
78
See, e.g., supra note 42 at 760; Cicena, Ltd. v. Columbia Telecommunications
Group, 900 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (applying Second Circuit law).
79
See supra note 42.
80
See id.
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what we see is a Supreme Court really struggling with product
configuration trade dress, so that, and as I think the other panelists
agree, the Court comes to the right decisions on the facts, but
reading the opinions closely, we see that the Court’s reasoning is
all over the place. The Court mixes and matches doctrines and
justifications and distinguishes its own precedents just to get to the
ultimate decision on the facts. The result, in my view, is that by
doing so, the Court in the last couple of years has created even
more uncertainty in the area of trade dress. The one message that
is clear from the Wal-Mart and TrafFix decisions is that the Court
is cutting back on trade dress protection. But unfortunately, there
is no coherence to the Court’s method of doing so.
In fairness to the Supreme Court, what I think this illustrates is
that we do not have a coherent, satisfying, theoretical foundation
for protecting product configuration trade dress and for defining
the proper boundaries of that protection. Since I am coming from
the practitioner’s perspective, what this means is that we are not
going to have meaningful predictability, which is extremely
important in the real world, until either someone comes up with a
satisfactory coherent theory, or someone – Congress, I suppose –
makes an explicit policy decision setting the standards for
protecting product configuration trade dress.
Just to clarify, when I am talking about a lack of predictability, I
don’t mean that every product design case is unpredictable, what I
mean is that after Two Pesos/Wal-mart/TrafFix, there will be many
difficult cases, where things get tricky, in some instances precisely
because of the decisions in these cases. Allow me to illustrate
what I mean by a difficult case. I did not bring a road sign81 with
me, because I thought it would be too heavy and because I think
that is an easy case. Here is my visual aid. It is a handbag. I think
it is a nice handbag. By the way, it is not made by a client, so I can
say anything I want to about it. I am a consumer for these
purposes.
This bag has a square bottom. Its sides, when the bag is flat, are
trapezoid. It is fairly different from other handbags. I could quite
easily argue that this particular shape in this type of fabric is
81

See TrafFix Devices, 121 S. Ct. at 1258 (2001) (involving road signs that were
connected to their base legs by two springs in order to remain upright despite adverse
wind conditions).
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distinctive for a handbag and should be protectable trade dress. I
don’t know whether people recognize it or not, though I would be
curious to know. In any event, this is an illustration of what I think
is a difficult trade dress case, both on a policy level and in terms of
applying what we can decipher to be the current law. First, let me
state explicitly the policy considerations I have in mind.
The ultimate difficult policy issue is this: Should this design be
protected under trademark law? Or, if it should be protected from
copying at all, should it be under a design patent, or possibly a
modified form of design patent protection, such as some sort of a
sui generis protection? At this point, we have neither a coherent
theory that could point to an answer, nor an explicit value
judgment by Congress.
I also want to point out two theoretical difficulties with product
configuration trade dress protection that have a very real effect in
this area.
First, trademark law is designed to protect reasonable consumer
expectations, in terms of whether something is a source identifier
or not.82 But there is a real circularity problem, so that if the law
protects something, the consumers can reasonably come to expect
that to be a source identifier. If, on the other hand, let’s take the
Wal-Mart v. Samara Brothers decision as an example, if anyone
can copy it – the children’s clothing design or the shape of this
handbag – then it is not going to be reasonable for consumers to
expect that look to be a source identifier.
The second problem inherent in the decision of whether a
product configuration should be protected as trade dress, is that if
we have a new design that is different, one that is original and
probably attractive, that design defines its own category of goods.
Again, I am going to use my handbag to illustrate. A lot of the
trade dress/trademark over-protection concerns revolve around
inhibiting competition. The functionality doctrine is supposed to
alleviate these concerns. And, as I am going to get into the
different tests for functionality, one is this: Are there enough
available alternative designs so that protecting this handbag design

82
See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 5:2 (discussing the development of
trademark in Anglo-American common law).
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under trademark law will not have an anticompetitive effect?83
Well, here is the question: What is the relevant product or the
relevant product category? Is it handbags generally, in which case
there are a lot of alternative designs available; or is it this particular
type of handbag that someone came up with and consumers have
come to like. Is that a separate category?
I believe that these problems – the circularity of consumer
expectations and definition of relevant product categories – are in
the background of every product design trade dress analysis.
These are my overarching themes.
Now, on functionality specifically, or really the requirement that
trade dress be non-functional in order to merit protection under
trademark law, that requirement is critically important, and it is
meant to address two theoretical concerns. Both of these concerns
have to do with competition.
One concern is that by over-extending trademark protection we
may foreclose competition. That is, in a way, just a general policy
concern: Competition in the marketplace is good and we want to
be very careful about foreclosing it. The reason we do allow, and
the courts have allowed, trade dress protection is because that
protection also encourages competition, and fair competition at
that,84 where the roots of trademark law lie in preventing free
riding on somebody else’s goodwill85 and protecting consumer
expectations in terms of who the producer of the good is.86 The
doctrine of functionality is important in addressing this concern
because it assures, at least in theory, that the types of features or
designs that are necessary for effective competition – in other
words functional features – are not protected under trademark law,
meaning that no single producer can monopolize them.
The second reason functionality has been considered extremely
important is because it can define the boundaries between
trademark protection and patent law protection.87 It all comes back
83

See generally Inna Fayenson, How Will High Court Rule?: Trade Dress Inherent
Distinctiveness Is at Issue, N.Y. L.J. Jan. 8, 2000 at S4.
84
See supra note 83.
85
See id.
86
See id.
87
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1984); 15 U.S.C. §§ 10511127 (1997 and 1999 Supplement). Also referred to as the Trademark Act of 1946.
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to the guiding principle that competition is very important and
competition is what we want to encourage. But the Constitution,
by virtue of the Intellectual Property Clause, specifically enabled
Congress to enact the patent and the copyright statutes88 because
there were good reasons to do that. We wanted to encourage
innovation or creativity and were willing to foreclose competition
in order to encourage those other good things, but only for a
limited time. In fact, the “limited time” is a Constitutional
requirement that comes from the Intellectual Property Clause itself
which gave Congress the authority “to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”89
The Constitutional dimension of the problem with protecting
something under trademark law is the lack of a time limit.90
Trademark protection may continue for so long as the trademark is
in use.91 Hence, the potential conflict between the patent law
regime, under which protection is available only for a limited time,
as mandated by the Patent Clause, and potentially perpetual
trademark protection.
Those arguments were certainly presented to the Supreme Court
in TrafFix92 because not only was there a theoretical possibility of
trademark protection without end, but also because the case
actually involved an expired utility patent.93
TrafFix is a decision about functionality. We know that because
of the general competition concern and the Constitutional fear of
trademark protection treading on patent ground, functionality or,
conversely, the non-functionality requirement, is extremely
important in the area of trade dress law.94 The question is: After
88

See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
See id.
90
See generally Perry J. Saidman, Kan TrafFix Kops Katch the Karavan Kopy Kats?
or Beyond Functionality: Design Patents are the Key to Unlocking the Trade
Dress/Patent Conundrum, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y. 839, 842-43 (2000)
(discussing the ramifications of trademark law’s lack of time limit in the trade dress
context).
91
Id.
92
See TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at 1263.
93
See id. at 1258.
94
See Inna Fayenson, ‘TrafFix’ Clarifies Some Issues, Raises Others, N.Y. L.J. Apr.
19, 2001 at 1.
89
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TrafFix, do we have the answer to the question of how to figure
out whether something is functional for trade dress purposes? My
answer is that after TrafFix we know sometimes, sort of, in some
cases.
TrafFix was, I think, a very easy case to decide on functionality
grounds. It involved, as Professor Hansen said, the design of
temporary roadside sign stands. A design involving two springs.
A design that was at one point patented. As was recited in the
patent application, and in the course of patent prosecution, that
design worked very well because it permitted the signs to
withstand gusts of wind.95
So what happened after the patent expired? A competitor copied
the design and the holder of the now-expired patent, Marketing
Displays, sued alleging trade dress infringement. Now, in
describing the trade dress that Marketing Displays alleged should
be protected, they talk not only about the two springs, but there
really wasn’t much more to the trade dress. The Supreme Court
goes through the alleged trade dress and, in essence, says, “Well,
what else is there? There are legs, there is a stand, there is a place
to put the sign. I mean, what kind of trade dress is that?”
The issue that was specifically before the Supreme Court in
TrafFix was: What effect should an expired utility patent have on
the issue of functionality and protectability of that same design
under trade dress law?96
Certainly, TrafFix, the defendant below, and some of the amicus
briefs, argued that if you previously had a patent, once the patent
expires, that previously protected invention/innovation is in the
public domain, that that is an essential part of the “patent
bargain.”97 In fact, this is something that the Supreme Court held
quite a while ago, in 1938, in the Kellogg case.98 That case
involved Shredded Wheat, the cereal, not the previously patented
machinery that was used to make it, that wasn’t in issue, but the
pillow shape of the cereal.99 In Kellogg, the Supreme Court came
out and said very clearly: After expiration of a patent, it is in the
95
96
97
98
99

See TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at 1258.
See id.
See TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at 1263.
See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 111 (1938).
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public domain, the public has a right to copy it.100
Sixty-three years later, the Supreme Court in TrafFix did not say
that.101 What they did say is that the utility patent is of great
importance in determining whether a feature that has been
proposed for trade dress protection is functional.102 In other words,
existence of an expired utility patent is not dispositive of the issue
but it “adds great weight to the presumption” of functionality.103
Basically, I think the practical rule, this is my paraphrasing of it,
from the TrafFix decision is: Anything you say in the course of
applying, procuring, or enforcing a utility patent can and will be
used against you to demonstrate functionality in trade dress.
The other part of the TrafFix decision, however, the part that I
think is more interesting, and is of much more general
applicability, is deciphering what the test for functionality should
be. Forget about whether there was ever a patent or not.
In a way, it starts with a footnote, as a lot of good stuff in
Supreme Court opinions used to. There was a Supreme Court
decision, Inwood Laboratories,104 that had nothing to do with
functionality, that was not in issue at all, but in a footnote the
Court articulated what became the test for functionality in trade
dress cases, by saying that a product feature is functional if it is
essential to the use or purpose of the article, or if it affects the cost
or quality of the article.105

100

“ It is self evident that on the expiration of the patent the monopoly granted by it
ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes
public property. It is upon this condition that the patent is granted.” Kellogg, 305 U.S. at
120 quoting Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896).
101
The Kellogg case was decided before the enactment of the Lanham Act and is,
therefore, not controlling precedent.
102
“Where the expired patent claimed the features in question, one who seeks to
establish trade dress protection must carry the heavy burden of showing that the feature is
not functional, for instance by showing that it is merely ornamental, incidental, or
arbitrary aspect of the device.” See TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at 1261.
103
See id.
104
456 U.S. 844 (1982) (At trial, the district court found that the color of prescription
medication pills is functional because people, at times, rely on color to identify different
types of medicine.).
105
See Inwood, 456 U.S. at 850, n.10 (1982) (“In general terms, a product feature is
functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or
quality of the article.” (citations omitted)).
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About thirteen years later, in the Qualitex case,106 which
considered whether color could serve as a trademark, the Court
repeated the Inwood Laboratories test to talk about functionality,
but then what they added – I think by way of explanation or
elaboration – was a feature is functional “if the exclusive use of the
feature would put competitors at a significant non-reputationrelated disadvantage.”107 Since then, and taking off from that
language, the courts would consider whether there are alternative
designs available for purposes of determining trade dress
functionality. That is what the Sixth Circuit in TrafFix did. It took
this portion of the functionality test so far as to say that hindering
competition “somewhat” is not enough, that the competitors’ nonreputation related disadvantage must be significant108 and
concluded that the dual spring design is not necessarily functional
because there are possible alternatives. The net result of this
reasoning was that the Sixth Circuit allowed Marketing Displays’
roadside stand design to be protected as trade dress.
The Supreme Court, obviously, thought that was wrong, but it
had to somehow address the possible alternative design analysis.
So what the Supreme Court in TrafFix did was to say : “Well, no,
it’s very clear what the test for functionality should be in a case
like this,” and it is not the test applied by the Sixth Circuit.109
First, according to the Supreme Court in TrafFix, we have the kind
of utilitarian functionality test, which is the original Inwood
Laboratories110 test, from a case that had nothing to do with
functionality; and that is, whether the feature is essential to the use
or purpose of the article or affects its cost or quality.111 That is the
basic functionality test. I will call it the first filter. It is only if
something gets through the first filter – meaning that the feature is
not functional under this test – that, according to TrafFix, you go
106
107
108

See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
Id. at 165.
See Marketing Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 940 (6th Cir.

1999).
109

532 U.S. at 1261.
In finding for MDI on the trade dress issue the Court of Appeals gave
insufficient recognition to the importance of the expired utility
patents, and their evidentiary significance, in establishing the
functionality of the device. The error likely was caused by its
misinterpretation of trade dress principles in other respects.

Id.

110
111

Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 1261.
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on to the second test, which examines the competitive advantage or
disadvantage.112
One of the more confusing things the Supreme Court said in
TrafFix, however, is that the second test – the competitive
necessity test – only applies in cases of aesthetic functionality,113
which is a doctrine that has floated around, has always been
problematic, and was put to rest, or so we thought.114 The Court
did not look at it for a while, even though I think in the Wal-Mart
v. Samara case there were some indications that the Court at least
thought about it.115 It seems to me that if the Court had been
serious about re-establishing aesthetic functionality as a trade dress
concept, Wal-Mart was a much more appropriate case for doing
that.
Instead, the Supreme Court in TrafFix, in a case that involved
road signs and a dual-spring design, revived, or so it seems, what is
known as the aesthetic functionality doctrine.116 The reason they
did so, I think, is because they were trying to somehow distinguish
or reconcile a prior case, Qualitex, without really considering the
implications.
So the bottom line after TrafFix is this: We know that a dualspring design that enables a roadside sign to withstand gusts of
wind, and that was previously protected by a utility patent, is
functional and, therefore, is not protectable as trade dress. But do
we know how, under what circumstances, would a design like my
bag be protected? Is this design aesthetically functional? I do not
know. We can examine whether alternative designs are available,
which is the test for aesthetic functionality, not just whether it is
pleasing. But then we come back to one of the problems I
112
See id. at 1262 (“Where the design is functional under the Inwood formulation
there is no need to proceed further to consider if there is a competitive necessity for the
future.”).
113
See id.
114
In general, the theory behind the aesthetic functionality doctrine is that designs that
do not have a utilitarian function may, nevertheless, be functional for trademark law
purposes, and hence not protectable, because their “function” is to be aesthetically
pleasing. See, e.g., Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952); see
generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 7:79-7.:83 (4th ed. 1996).
115
529 U.S. at 213 (“Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition
with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves
by a rule of law that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants based upon
alleged inherent distinctiveness.”).
116
See Fayenson, supra note 94.
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mentioned in the beginning: Whether alternative designs are
available depends on how you define the product, the relevant
product category.
Ultimately, my point is that we have had a couple of Supreme
Court decisions that seem to be very clear on where they are
coming out.117 In Wal-Mart we have a bright-line rule: You must
have secondary meaning.118 In TrafFix, here is the test for
utilitarian functionality,119 here is the test for aesthetic
functionality.120
At the end of the day, though, we have not gained a whole lot of
predictability, at least in the difficult cases. The only way I think
we can attain predictability is if there is a policy decision that is
made on whether something like this bag should be protected or
not.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Thank you, Inna.
Our next speaker is Perry J. Saidman of the Saidman DesignLaw
Group in Washington, D.C., who will address what the Court
avoided in TrafFix, the patent spin.
MR. SAIDMAN: It is a pleasure to be here. I am honored to be
on this panel. I am particularly honored that I am the only patent
lawyer on the panel, but please don’t hold that against me. I was
brought in to give you the patent spin on what happened in TrafFix
and what the Court is doing with trade dress.
I have brought slides to keep you awake. You know, it is much
easier to give a forty-five minute talk than figure out what you
need to say in only fifteen or twenty minutes. So, in view of the
limited time, I think I am going to just dispense with the family
slides and cut to the chase.
[Slide] When you are talking about designs, I think you’ve got
to see the designs. Here is the famous tertium quid of the Two
117

See id.
See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 216 (“We hold that, in an action for infringement of
unregistered trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product’s design is
distinctive, and therefore protectible, only upon a showing of secondary meaning.”).
119
See TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at 1261-62.
120
See id.
118
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Pesos case. The “good guy’s” restaurant is on the left and the “bad
guy’s” is on the right.
[Slide] Here are some of the designs involved in the Wal-Mart
case. Again, the “good guy’s” clothing is on the left, the “bad
guy’s” is on the right. Here is the flower dress, and here is the
famous strawberry dress.
[Slide] In TrafFix, we have the plaintiff’s, “good guy’s,” the
original sign on the left, and the virtually identical defendant’s
design on the right, both having the closely-spaced springs at the
bottom. You have seen these. There are probably twenty right out
here on 62nd Street.
[Slide] On the next slide you’ve got the plaintiff’s design on the
left and the expired utility patent on the right that has the springs
spaced further apart than the actual commercial model on the
left.121
Now, the most fascinating issue in TrafFix was the one that the
Supreme Court completely dodged.
[Slide] The U.S. Constitution says that: “Congress has the
power to promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries.”122 This is the
basis for patent law.
The limited time right now, as most of you know, is twenty
years for a utility patent123 and fourteen years for a design
patent.124 When a patent expires, the subject matter falls into the
public domain, free to be made, used, or sold by anyone. As was
pointed out by the previous speakers, trade dress rights can last
forever, as long as the owner is using the mark.
So the killer question, the one the Supreme Court dodged, is: “Is
it constitutional to grant exclusive trade dress rights for an
unlimited duration under the federal Lanham Act, the Trademark
Act,125 for a design that is the subject of an expired patent?”

121
122
123
124
125

See Saidman, supra note 90 (containing pictures of the signs at issue).
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8.
35 U.S.C. § 154 (1984).
Id. § 173 (1984).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (1997 and 1999 Supplement). Also referred to as the
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My answer to that question is, “No,” despite the fact that no
court has ever so held. And I believe that the answer to that
question is completely independent of the functionality doctrine,
and has more to do with the bargain made between the designer
and the public. The bargain is this: “We’ll give you your patent,
you can have a monopoly for fourteen or twenty years, but when it
is over, it’s over. The public will then be able to make free use of
your product design.”
I think few of us on the panel would argue with the tremendous
expansion of rights resulting from Court enforcement of Section of
43(a)126 over the past thirty years to include, as has been pointed
out, not only packaging of products, but also product
configuration, or what the Court has come to call “product design.”
Now, in my view, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Wal-Mart127
and TrafFix128 are in reaction to the overreaching of creative
lawyers using “good guy/bad guy” emotional appeals to courts for
their desperate clients whose products have been copied at a time
when copyright and patent protection are not available, either
because the product is not copyrightable, it is too late to apply for a
patent, or, as in the TrafFix case, the patent has expired. This
happens a lot, as we will see.
Most courts, even here in the Southern District of New York,
give in to this emotional appeal.129 The reason they do that is
because no one is arguing on behalf of the public interest, the
public’s right to copy product designs whose patents have expired.
The fees of skilled and creative lawyers are paid by protectionists
who want to be able to monopolize their product design as long as
possible. I am one of those lawyers.
Besides, it is unpopular to argue that someone who has copied
another’s design has a perfect right to do so. It is like the ACLU
defending the Nazis’ right to march in Skokie.
So the lower courts, in enforcing Section 43(a) rights very, very
broadly, have ignored some old right-to-copy precedent by the
Trademark Act of 1946.
126
Lanham Act § 43(a) codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1997 and 1999
Supplement).
127
See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 205.
128
See TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at 1255.
129
See Saidman, supra note 90.
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Supreme Court. In Wal-Mart and TrafFix, what I see is the Court
reacting by greatly narrowing, if not killing, Section 43(a) rights
and, as Professor Hansen pointed out, giving a warning in the last
paragraph of the TrafFix opinion, that it is going to revisit the
constitutional issue if the lower courts do not restrict trade dress
rights.130
In this very brief time I am going to review a handful of the
cases in this area, I’m going to talk a little bit about increasingly
important design patents, and conclude with my prediction on
where the courts might be headed.
[Slide] The most significant right-to-copy case is the 1938
decision of Kellogg v. National Biscuit.131 In the Kellogg case
Nabisco had utility patents on the famous Shredded Wheat biscuit
and the machines for making it.132 Nabisco also had a design
patent on the shape of the biscuit.133 Now, all of these patents had
expired by the time Nabisco sued to enjoin Kellogg’s sale of
pillow-shaped biscuits of Shredded Wheat.
Let’s see what Justice Brandeis had to say:
A design patent was taken out to cover the pillowshaped form. Hence, upon expiration of the patents,
the form as well as the name was dedicated to the
public. Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in
the goodwill of the article known as ‘Shredded
Wheat;’ and thus is sharing in a market which was
created by the skill and judgment of [Nabisco] and
has been widely extended by vast expenditures in
advertising. But that is not unfair. Sharing in the
goodwill of an article unprotected by patent is the
exercise of a right possessed by all, and in the free
exercise of which the consuming public is deeply
interested.134
Now, this case was decided long before the Federal Lanham Act
was passed, so it is not directly on point, but it does set out what I
feel are the controlling principles.
130
131
132
133
134

See TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at 1263.
See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 111.
See e.g., U.S. Patent No. 548,086 (issued Oct. 15, 1895).
See U.S. Design Patent No. 24,688 (issued Sept. 17, 1895).
Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 122.
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There are a lot of cases exactly like this from that era and before
and afterwards. How have the lower courts dealt with this issue?
[Slide] A typical case is Krueger International v. Nightingale,
Inc. 135 from the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff had
obtained a design patent in 1978,136 shown on the left, covering the
very same chair design rights it was now asserting against
Nightingale under Section 43(a).
[Slide] The defendant’s chair is shown on the left in this slide
next to the plaintiff’s expired design patent. Judge Sotomayor did
not see a problem in a design owner asserting trade dress rights in
a product that was the subject of an expired design patent.137
[Slide] The Topps v. Verburg case138 did the same thing. After
the plaintiff’s design patent139 on its diamond ring lollipop, shown
at the top, expired, they got a trademark registration140 on the same
design, shown at the bottom, which the judge had no trouble
enforcing against a competitor.141
Now, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
routinely issues trademark registrations covering product designs
that are the subject of expired patents.142
[Slide] Perhaps the most famous is where Honeywell obtained a
trademark registration143 on its round thermostat – the registration
is on the bottom – which was the subject matter of its expired
design patent, shown at the top.144
[Slide] Here is a trademark registration that covers the
configuration of the world’s best-selling desk lamp, known as the
Tizio.145 This lamp was the subject of a utility patent, invented in
135

915 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
U.S. Design Patent No. 246,813 (issued Jan. 3, 1978).
137
See Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 605.
138
Topps Co. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18556, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1412 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1996).
139
U.S. Patent No. Des.242,646 (issued Dec. 7, 1976).
140
U.S. Trademark Reg. No.1,846,873 (registered July 26, 1994).
141
See Topps Co. v. Gerrit J. V, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18556 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12,
1996).
142
See Saidman, supra note 90 at 847.
143
U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 1,622.108 (registered Nov. 13, 1990).
144
In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344; U.S. Patent No. Des.176,657 ( issued Jan.
17, 1956).
145
U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 1,442,994 (registered June 16, 1987).
136
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1971 by Richard Sapper,146 a well-known designer, and shortly
after that, he licensed it to Artemide who produced the Tizio. The
claim in this utility patent covers the structure of this lamp. This
patent expired two weeks after the trademark registration issued.
This registration should never have been issued, due to the rightto-copy doctrine.147 The right to copy without unduly restrictive
monopolies fosters competition, and, hence, low prices for
consumers, which is good. As you can see, the public’s right to
copy has been virtually ignored by the PTO and in many trade
dress infringement cases, including at least half-a-dozen 1980s
cases in which the configuration of this lamp was successfully
litigated.148
[Slide] You will forgive me, I think, but in view of what the
Supreme Court is doing to Section 43(a) for product designs,
which is demolishing it, I feel obligated to share with you, with
trademark lawyers, my list of the Top Ten Reasons for Getting
Design Patents.
Reason Number Ten: There is never a need to prove secondary
meaning to get a design patent. It doesn’t matter how many you
sold. So design patents are ideal for brand new products.
Reason Number Nine: Functionality is almost never a problem
with design patents. In the thousands of applications I have
handled, I have never even had the patent examiner raise
functionality as an issue.
Reason Number Eight: The standard of obviousness is rarely a
problem with respect to newly designed products. I would say we
get an obviousness rejection in only one out of ten design patent
applications, and these are usually pretty easy to overcome.
Reason Number Seven: It is possible to get design patents very,
very quickly. They have a new “rocket docket” system at the
Patent Office that allows design patents to sail through.

146

U.S. Patent No. 3,790,773 (issued Feb. 5, 1974).
See Saidman, supra note 90 at 846.
148
See, e.g., PAF S.r.l. v. Lisa Lighting Co., 712 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Artemide SpA v. Grandrich Corp., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16742 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5,
1987); Artemide SpA v. Grandlite Design & Mfg. Co., 672 F. Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
147
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[Slide] Here is one that we were able to get in five months from
the time of filing.
[Slide] And we got better and better. Here is one we got in
about four months.
[Slide] Three and a half months.
[Slide] And the pièce de resistance, this one issued within two
months of its filing date. It is possible to get them quickly if you
need them.
Reason Number Six: Design patents are good for fourteen years
from the day they issue.149 They do not require the payment of
maintenance fees,150 as utility patents do, or the filing of
continued-use affidavits, as trademarks do.151
Reason Number Five: You have a great chance of obtaining a
preliminary injunction (“PI”) in a design patent case. In a fiveyear period recently, 70 percent of the PI motions were granted.152
The judges can see with their own eyes that the design has been
infringed.
Reason Number Four: The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has exclusive nationwide jurisdiction over all patent
cases.153 This is in contrast to trademark law, where, as you know,
the various circuits are about to do battle for the next ten years
over the doctrine of functionality and what it means, thanks to
TrafFix. The Federal Circuit’s rulings on issues like willful
infringement,154 which can get you triple damages and attorneys’
fees,155 have greatly benefited design patent owners.
Reason Number Three: Design patents are very flexible. It is
very easy to protect individual components of a design as well as
the overall product. I’ve got some examples here.

149

35 U.S.C. § 173 (1984).
35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (1999).
151
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1997 and 1999 Supplement). Also referred to as the
Trademark Act of 1946.
152
See Perry J. Saidman, Design Patents - the Whipping Boy Bites Back, 73 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 859, 866 (1991).
153
35 U.S.C. § 141(1984).
154
Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
155
35 U.S.C. §§ 284-287 (1984).
150
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[Slide] Here is the design patent by Bruce Burdick covering a
new flatware design which consists of metal flatware and a plastic
piece that is on the rear part of the flatware.156 We were able to get
a design patent not only on the combination but on the plastic
handle by itself,157 the metal knife,158 the metal fork,159 the metal
spoon,160 and the bumps that were on the plastic handles161 in
combination, with the support knob that is below the flatware.162
And again, we were able to get a design patent on just that feature
of the support knob that rests below the flatware.
[Slide] Now the fashion industry is beginning to use design
patents. Here are a couple of design patents that issued just this
year to Levi-Straus on jean designs.163
[Slide] And design patents are even being used to protect
packaging. Here is a design patent on the Aquafresh toothpaste
box, which includes a hologram feature about the periphery.164
The Number Two reason for getting design patents is that the
test for infringement is quite broad. It goes back 130 years to a
great case for design patent owners, Gorham v. White.165
[Slide] If you look at these drawings, all you have to know is
that the Supreme Court found both of the White designs,166 on the
left and on the right, to be infringements of the Gorham patent167 in
the middle. So, despite what you may have heard, design patents
do have scope and the infringing design does not need to be
identical to the patented design for infringement to be proved.
So what’s the Number One reason for getting design patents? It
is this: What choice has the Supreme Court given you?

156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

U.S. Design Patent No. 346,722 (issued May 10, 1994).
U.S. Design Patent No. 345,486 (issued Mar. 29, 1994).
U.S. Design Patent No. 345,284 (issued Mar. 22, 1994).
U.S. Design Patent No. 358,741 (issued May 30, 1995).
U.S. Design Patent No. 351,091 (issued Oct. 4, 1994).
U.S. Design Patent No. 355,565 (issued Feb. 21, 1995).
U.S. Design Patent No. 351,310 (issued Oct. 11, 1994).
U.S. Design Patent Nos. 436,714 (issued Jan. 30, 2001); 437,102 (issued Feb. 6,

2001).
164
165
166
167

U.S. Design Patent No. 420,910 (issued Feb. 22, 2000).
81 U.S. 511 (1871).
U.S. Design Patent Nos. 2,551 (Jan. 15, 1867); 2,992 (Mar. 31, 1868).
U.S. Design Patent No. 1,440 (Jul. 16, 1861).
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Although a design patent will cost you $2,000 or $3,000, it is a
bargain compared to the cost of going to court with your
unregistered trade dress, trying to prove it has secondary meaning
and that the design is not essential to the use or purpose of the
article, does not affect the cost or quality of the article, and will not
put competitors at a disadvantage if they are denied use of it. What
is that going to cost?
So, suing under Section 43(a) is now, I think, somewhat of a
crap shoot, and you may as well tell your client to head for Atlantic
City.
Where will the Supreme Court and the lower courts go, now that
the pendulum is decidedly swinging away from Section 43(a)
protection for product design? I think, just like after Two Pesos,
where the lower courts struggled for years to find a test for
inherent distinctiveness, they are now going to struggle to apply
the Inwood and Qualitex definitions of functionality. The
definition of functionality from Inwood will be used as the
standard for testing for utilitarian functionality, and the definition
from Qualitex will be used as the test for aesthetic functionality,
which rises like a phoenix from the ashes.
The existence of alternate designs, the Court said in TrafFix, will
only be relevant in cases of aesthetic functionality.168 And, while
the Inwood test will be used with product designs protected by
utility patents, the Qualitex test, I predict, will be used with
product designs protected by design patents whose subject matter
is, by definition, aesthetic or ornamental. We had a hint of this in
the Wal-Mart case, where the Court spoke about unusual product
designs making the product more appealing.169
Now, is there any precedent, you might ask, for using aesthetic
functionality to test whether a product design protected by a design
patent may also have §43(a) trade dress protection? The only case
I have found was right here in the Second Circuit, a 1984 decision
from the Court of Appeals called Saporiti v. Craig.170 It was a
168

See TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at, 1261.
See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213 (“Consumers are aware of the reality that, almost
invariably, even the most unusual product designs – such as a cocktail shaker shaped like
a penguin – is intended not to identify the source, but to render the product itself more
useful or more appealing.”).
170
See Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, 725 F.2d 18 (2d Cir.
1984).
169
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Section 43(a) action based on a sofa design that was the subject of
an expired design patent.171
Judge Clement Haynsworth, who was at one time nominated to
sit on the Supreme Court, gave a definition of functionality that
was a precursor to the Inwood definition: “A feature is clearly
functional if it is an important ingredient in the commercial success
of the product.”172 Haynsworth was very clear that functional was
not the same as utilitarian and not the opposite of ornamental. In
fact, he found the sofa design functional because it was “attractive
to buyers.”173
This is classic aesthetic functionality, and here it comes again. If
you are confused about this, just imagine how the federal judges
are going to deal with this. One might well ask: “If this becomes
the test, what kind of product design will be protectable under
Section 43(a)?”
[Slide] So what is the bottom line? The party is over for
Section 43(a) trade dress protection for product design.
I have three pieces of advice: Number one, get design patents.
Number two, get design patents. And number three of course
speaks for itself [get design patents].
Thank you.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Thank you very much, Perry. That
was very interesting.
Now we want to open up the discussion to members of our
audience either for comments or questions. Any questions,
thoughts?
PARTICIPANT: I have a question for Mr. Saidman. Other than
case law, do you feel that there is a policy justification for why the
patent statute’s limit on protection of design should trump those of
the Lanham Act174and associated trademark statutes?

171

See id.
See id. at 19.
173
See id. at 20.
174
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (1997 and 1999 Supplement). Also referred to as the
Trademark Act of 1946.
172
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MR. SAIDMAN: Well, one could argue that the Lanham Act is
based on the Commerce Clause175 and it is trumped by Article 1,
Clause 8, Section 8 of the Constitution,176 which is the
constitutional basis for passing the patent and the copyright acts.
So you could argue that.
But really, the policy justification can be as simple as: it is more
important to promote the progress of science and the useful arts
than it is to prevent a little consumer confusion. This has to do
with the fact that §43(a) is not a design protection law, it is a
consumer protection law. This was articulated best, I think, by the
10th Circuit in the Vornado v. Duracraft177 case. For other
excellent discussions of the policy issues, see the dissents in
Ferrari v. Roberts178 from the 6th Circuit, and Kohler v. Moen179
from the 7th Circuit.
Also remember that the Supreme Court stands as the last barrier
against overuse of §43(a), because the Court likes competition, and
exclusive rights like trade dress are anticompetitive. The Court
wants people to be able to freely copy products that are in the
public domain – that, I think, is the undercurrent of what is going
on.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Any comments on that from other
panelists?
Just on the Constitutional issue, I do not think it is clear, and I do
not think the Court wants to reach that issue, because then you
would have all sorts of implications for other laws, and they do not
usually want to bind the hand of Congress on what it can do. It is
very, very difficult for the Court to say there is no power in the
government to do something that the government wants to do.
It is one thing to say that the federal government has power and
the states, therefore, do not. However, it is another thing entirely
to say that nobody has it. Most justices, even if they think the
policy is wrong, do not want to handcuff the government in that
way. So, I think they would be reluctant to do it, and that is
probably why they reserved the decision, and they may not have
175
176
177
178
179

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995).
Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1248 (6th Cir. 1991).
Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc. 12 F.3d 632, 644 (7th Cir. 1993).
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the votes for it in any case.
But, to some degree, what is interesting is the practicality of
another one of these cases reaching the Supreme Court, because
how many people can afford litigation to get to the Supreme
Court? The normal defendants in these cases cannot. Wal-Mart is
not a normal defendant, and it can finance these things.
But I just ask the practitioners here, in your experience, certainly
in copyright cases, your normal cases, you have a preliminary
injunction and an appeal, and that’s it. You never even get to a
trial unless you combine the trial with the preliminary injunction
hearing, right? What is your feeling about this type of litigation?
Even if it does protect people, will they still be scared away from
the thought of the litigation, and so the practical effect will be less
than the theoretical effect?
MR. MITCHELL: I think that remains to be seen. Certainly the
cases that get up to the Court are few and far between. There is the
occasional petition for certiorari. There is some fear of the
anticompetitive strike suits. Nevertheless, the law is slow-moving
and conservative, and I think that the Wal-Mart case, whether it is
on the designer side or the copier side, is going to help the big guy,
because the small guy is not going to have the money to try to
enforce his rights and prove secondary meaning, and the big guy
can, nevertheless, always put enough into litigation, keep it going
long enough, to win a war of attrition.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay.
Yes? And please identify your affiliation, because we are
publishing this, and we would like to give you proper credit.
PARTICIPANT: Victor Servey [phonetic]. I’m a patent attorney
practicing in New York.
Do you ever see the day when Rule 11180 sanctions would be
imposed for trying to enforce a trademark based on an expired
patent or a design patent or whatever?
MR. MITCHELL: There has been no per se rule, and I think if
you’ve got enough skilled argument to come up with the reason,
Rule 11 should not come into play. When I was discussing this
180

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. R. 11.
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case with a patent lawyer in my firm – he is writing an article from
the patent side about TrafFix, I’m writing an article from the
trademark side – his advice to patent lawyers was make sure you
put in your patent application enough self-serving language that
you can then argue that this is totally arbitrary.
On the TrafFix case he argued – I disagree, but he argued – that
if you said: “Well, the springs can be in any position, just as long
as there are two of them,” then he could argue that he could protect
his own design of springs so long as there are other ways of doing
it.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I do not think there would be any Rule
11181 sanctions, certainly not on the basis of the Supreme Court
decision. I don’t think so.
MR. SERVEY: Basically, the way I see it, until the
Constitutional question that Mr. Saidman brought up is answered,
there is an incentive for using the threat of litigation to enforce
your design rights into perpetuity.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: The reason that most people do not
think there is a conflict between patent law and trademark law is
they protect two different things. Patent law protects things which
are non-obvious, useful, and novel, and they are meant as
incentives to research and development and whatever. Trademark
law is there to prevent consumer confusion, and also free riding on
goodwill. These types of protection are different and not mutually
exclusive. They can both be applied and there is nothing
inherently wrong in saying a trademark should exist after a patent.
The problem is: When the trademark itself has a specific, truly
functional, utilitarian advantage that competitors are now going to
be denied after the fact, how do you balance the two? So, it is
legitimate to say that one policy should prevail over the other. It is
much more difficult to say the Constitution defines that policy.
I doubt very much that the Supreme Court is going to go that
way, and I am not sure whether the Court will be presented with an
opportunity to do so, considering the costs involved to litigants.
But I guess we will see.
181

Id.
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In the back?
QUESTION: Marsha Ajhar with Abelman Frayne & Schwab
here in New York.
First of all, I was happy when Pagliero182 was dead, and I am
not at all sure that aesthetic functionality is the way to go. I didn’t
get it the first time around, so it is going to be curious to see what
happens to it next time.
The second thought that I had was that harmonization seems to
be a trend internationally. We are desperately trying to get the EU
and different treaties going. A decision like TrafFix, and the
aftermath. is going to cause heart attacks in Milan and other
European cities where protecting design is critical.
I wonder what sort of observations or predictions you might
have about possible ramifications internationally, because it seems
like we’re definitely the “Wild, Wild West” when it comes to
protecting product designs.
MS. FAYENSON: Well, I guess one possibility, as Perry
Saidman said, may be that more people will start utilizing design
patent protection. I agree it is the more appropriate way to protect
product design.
Could we end up with a sui generis design protection statute,
like a lot of European countries do? I don’t know. That is
something that has been pending for how many years?
MR. SAIDMAN: For seventy or eighty years there have been
laws in front of Congress.
MS. FAYENSON: Trying to get that enacted will be very
difficult.
MR. SAIDMAN: Right. And this might well be the thing that
forces Congress to take another look at that. The last time this was
brought up was maybe ten years ago, just before Clinton was
elected,183 but the bill died because of a big lobby from the spare
parts people and the insurance industry, who did not want a “cheap
and dirty” design protection bill, which is the way they protect
182

Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
Design Innovation and Technology Act of 1991 (HR 1790); See Cong. Rec.
4/16/91, p. H2249, and 4/17/91, p. E1279 for introductory remarks.
183
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designs in Europe it is like a copyright, and that does not exist here
in the States.
PARTICIPANT: Has there been any mention of taking the term
for a design patent and extending it? I mean, fourteen years184
really does not seem very generous, compared to the twenty for
utilitarian.185 Any sort of groundswell for extension?
MS. FAYENSON: I would think that if there were a design
protection statute, it would have a shorter life span. I am not sure
that we should be looking at expanding the time frame for it. That
is my thought. If we are talking about anything like the fashion
industry, fourteen years is forever.
Most designs become
irrelevant after six months anyway.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: My suit might be fourteen years old
actually.
MS. FAYENSON: I’m sorry. Well, some of them come back.
MR. MITCHELL: They all come back, vinyl pants even.
Also, I think that, as opposed to utility patents, with a design
patent, one way you can also look at it is that you’ve got fourteen
years, and a design patent is by definition a non-utilitarian item, so
you are not dealing with a functionality issue. So that gives you
your time to do what you can to get secondary meaning and to
build that up.
MS. FAYENSON: Yes, but I actually think that is the really
interesting question and the real problem. Should you be able to
use design patent protection for those fourteen years. Let’s
imagine something that is not going out of style – to build up
secondary meaning, and then say: “Well, here we go. Now I
clearly have secondary meaning?”
The funny thing that the Supreme Court did in the Wal-Mart186
case is it almost seemed to go that way, because in addressing the
concern about protecting innovators who may come up with
something inherently distinctive, even though the Court says: “We
don’t think that’s really possible.” Let’s say they do; they can look
to design patent or copyright for protection before they have
184
185
186

35 U.S.C. § 173 (1984).
35 U.S.C. § 154 (1984).
See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 205.
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secondary meaning. To me, that is just the Supreme Court getting
it all mixed up.
That is the case I would actually like to see before the Supreme
Court, something protected by design patent, clearly not
functional, it acquires secondary meaning in a very clear, tangible,
demonstrable way. Should it be protected under trade dress law?
MR. SAIDMAN: As an aside, the term for design patents is
about to be bumped up by one year to fifteen years as the result of
the U.S. assent to the Hague Agreement for the protection of
designs.187
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Looking at Perry’s presentation, as a
non-patent lawyer, it seemed to me that design patents are granted
too easily and that the infringement standard is close to ridiculous.
If the Supreme Court ever got a look at your presentation, design
patents would be next up on their hit list.
MR. SAIDMAN: We haven’t had a design patent case in the
Supreme Court for 130 years, so shhh.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I used to think they were hard to get
and that it was good that they were hard to get. If those are easy to
get, it actually seems anticompetitive to me, because it just wasn’t
readily apparent to me – the non-obviousness or novelty of those
as standards. Are they still standards?
MR. SAIDMAN: Yes.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Pretty watered-down, though, aren’t
they?
MR. SAIDMAN: Well, you know, how do you know when
something is non-obvious or inherently distinctive?
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I know it when I see it.
MS. FAYENSON: But might not the same thing happen as
happened in the business methods patent area, where people just
focused on it, and there was so much around that the PTO started
enforcing the non-obviousness?

187
Hague Conference Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 65 Fed. Reg. 61306-02 (Oct. 17, 2000).

TM PANEL.PP8

550

9/6/01 11:21 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.11:509

MR. SAIDMAN: You know, the pendulums swing in all the
areas of the law. When they get overused, something bites you and
it swings back in the other direction.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: There was a hand over here?
PARTICIPANT: Bruce Lederman [phonetic]. I am a solo
practitioner. I represent a number of small businesses that are
always being accused of knocking off one thing or another.
I am wondering if the panel has any thoughts on this case
involving sports teams, which I had and settled a couple of years
ago and have thought about since. One case that came up is you
have Michael Jordan playing in a red uniform that says “Chicago
Bulls” and “Michael Jordan” on the back, and then somebody
comes to you and says: “I have a good idea. Let’s sell a red T-shirt
that says ‘23.’ We’re not going to write ‘Chicago Bulls,’ we’re not
going to write ‘Michael Jordan.’ But there are a ton of kids out
there who would just like a bright-red basketball shirt that says
‘23.’”
I am wondering, listening to some of the discussion on the more
recent Supreme Court cases, if the panel has any thoughts on that.
MR. MITCHELL: One problem that you would have, the one
place where Michael Jordan might get a chance to come up with an
argument, would be on a right of publicity statute,188 to say that he
is so identified with number twenty-three. But he would have a
problem with exclusivity because there are sports teams all over
that have red uniforms that have twenty-three on them. So that one
is tougher.
I did run into a case recently, though, where someone was
selling T-shirts that replicated all the tattoos on Dennis Rodman’s
body, and he managed to get those enjoined. I don’t know how
anybody managed to sell them, but he managed to get them
enjoined nonetheless.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: That would be an easy case. I think
more people are aware of ‘23’ than of all the tattoos on Rodman’s
body. It seems that ‘23’ is an easy publicity case, and I think that
would be enjoined in a second. The point of publicity cases is that
188
See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 28:17, n. 1; Sudakshina Sen, Comment, Fluency
of the Flesh: Perils of an Expanding Right of Publicity, 59 ALB. L. REV. 739 (1995).
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you are using the good will someone generates with the public
without payment or authorization. The point is the use of the good
will, and it does not matter if you use the number of a race car
associated with a driver,189 a car associated with a T.V. show,190 or
“Here’s Johnny.” I would think a right of publicity, on these facts,
would be fairly easy to litigate for the plaintiff. Furthermore,
Michael Jordan is someone who has the resources and access to
counsel that would enhance the chance of an action being brought.
MR. SAIDMAN: If you want to make red T-shirts with the
number ‘23’ on them, I’ll be glad to represent you.
PARTICIPANT: Evan Katz, IP Network.
The discussion calls to mind the use of watching services191 for
companies to make sure that dubious trademark registrations do
not slip through, or perhaps even dubious design patents, to oppose
or seek re-examination. I am curious if the panelists have advised
their clients to have industry-wide watches on both the patent and
the trademark side to try to nip in the bud overly broad trademark
registrations or design patents?
I also wanted to know if the panel is aware of what is being done
on the trademark side of the PTO concerning the following point:
Namely, how in the world can non-engineering trademark
engineers consider functionality issues in an ex parte trademark
application setting without really pulling the patent people in, or
perhaps punting it entirely over to an inter partes proceeding
where the board might have a better shot?
MS. FAYENSON: First of all, in terms of trademark watching
services, I almost always advise clients to do that. In trade dress
registration, it is a little tougher because there are more judgment
calls involved with just word trademarks as well, but that is
something that we do routinely. Certainly the clients who can
think about it and can afford it do that.
MR. MITCHELL: It is also tough. I have been involved in a
couple of oppositions to registration of trade dress features, where
189

See, e.g., Lothar Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 498 F.2d
821 (9th Cir. 1974).
190
See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F. 2d 327 (2d Cir. 1983).
191
See e.g., www.thomson-thomson.com, www.marksonline.com (last visited June
26, 2001).
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my client, the opposer, claimed that: “This is not distinctive” or
“This is generic,” and you start out and your client is gung-ho for
protecting everyone’s right to use the design. Ultimately what
happens is they get tired of paying your bills, the other side gets
tired of fighting, and you, as often as not, wind up coming up with
a settlement where the opposition is dropped for a royalty-free,
basically a naked license.192
MS. FAYENSON: That works sometimes.
MR. SAIDMAN: It works for the client, anyway.
MS. FAYENSON: But, in reality, it is possible, not always, to
achieve both sides’ objectives, if they can really define where the
confusion might come into play, if you’re going to be idealistic
about it.
MR. KATZ: I think the cases underscore the point. Most of my
clients when I was in private practice had watch services193 for
their trademarks only, but, given the reasonable cost of having a
watch service across the entire industry to try to flag some of these
before they come out, it can be a lot cheaper than litigating them
up through any court system.
PARTICIPANT: My name is Stanley Garrett. I am a general
practitioner spending some of my time counseling clients who
want to be protected against what they call counterfeiters of their
products that have legitimately acquired secondary meaning.
This TrafFix case obviously is of great concern because in one
situation – and I would appreciate the panel’s advice – the feature
that gives the product its uniqueness and its acceptance in the
market, unlike the marketing device case, is invisible. You can’t
see it, it is buried within the product, but it enables the product to
achieve the distinctive look that the public now identifies with the
source of the product.
So my question is: Does the fact that there is a utility patent on
that invisible feature prevent my client from enforcing its rights
against an infringer?

192
193

See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 18:48 (discussing naked licensing).
See supra note 191.
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MR. MITCHELL: That is essentially the Kellogg case. One
aspect of the Kellogg case was the machine that made the
Shredded Wheat biscuits in a certain shape came into the public
domain, and since that device came into the public domain, the
product of that device did. So I think it certainly is something you
might have some problems with. Even though the thing that was
patented is invisible, if the appearance was created by something
that was patented, it is grounds for an argument.
MS. FAYENSON: But that it comes into the public domain is
not necessarily the law. I am very interested in that situation,
because maybe that is just the right case, where you do not see the
functional feature at all, but it is the look that becomes distinctive
and truly should be protectable under trademark law.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Are you saying the look was
dependent upon the utility patent, that the look derives directly
from enforcement of the utility patent?
MR. GARRETT: We would argue that there are alternative ways
to achieve the look. Indeed, we are making that argument in the
Trademark Office. But it would seem to me, as I read TrafFix, that
may not be the case.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Everyone who uses your patent that
has expired will get the same look automatically. Is that the
scenario?
MR. GARRETT: They might be able to. That is right. They
might be able to get that look after the patent expired.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Well, that’s problematic.
MR. GARRETT: And they might be able to get that look today
by some alternative design.
MR. SAIDMAN: The Supreme Court has not gotten that far.
And even if they adopted my radical view, which is doubtful, but if
they did, I would say that the way to test it would be to look at the
patent claims and see what subject matter is actually in the public
domain, and that subject matter is free to be made by anyone.
Now, the issue is: Can it look like yours or must it look like
someone else’s? And if you cannot really see the functional
components, then you might have a sliver of an argument that the
exterior look is protectable and you can develop secondary
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meaning in it, because it does not depend on the subject matter that
is in the public domain by virtue of the expired claims.
MS. FAYENSON: Is the only function of that invisible feature
to give the product that look, or does it do other stuff within the
product?
MR. GARRETT: I think, in all fairness, it is probably the
principal feature. It enables the product to be distinctive and
achieve the secondary meaning.
MR. SAIDMAN: Well, then I change my mind. Good question,
counselor.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Any further questions? Well, I think
that is the last word. I want to thank the panelists for their
excellent and interesting presentations.
MR. GALBRAITH: Thank you again to all the panelists and
attendees for participating.

